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"Before my highest mountain I stand and before my 
longest wandering; to that end I must first go down 
deeper than ever I descended-deeper into pain than 
ever I descended, down into its blackest flood." 
-Friedrich Nietzsche, TItUS Spoke Zarathustra 
The Heideggerian philosophy of Being and Time,! properly con­
ceived, is a pilgrimage. It is an attempt to pave a way into the 
uncharted territory of the fundamental ontological question of what 
it means to be. The question has thus far remained uncharted not 
only because it has been neglected and "covered over" by Western 
thought, but also because its pursuit requires confronting the very 
reality we spend our lives avoiding: Death. The fundamentalonto­
logical question becomes an issue, Heidegger argues, only if we are 
responsive to the intimation of nothingness disclosed in angst. 
What angst reveals is not some abstract conception of nothing­
ness which Dasein may objectively evaluate; rather, it confronts 
Dasein with its Sein-zum-tode (Being-towards-death), with its own 
liability to nothingness, with its own possibility of the impossibili ty 
of its being. Thus, the primary presumption we have about our­
selves-that we are-is undermined by an intimation that reveLlls 
that we are able not to be. Such intimations are ordinarily not 
embraced by Dasein, they are repressed, swallowed by our busy 
concern with everyday affairs. But Being and Time is profoundly 
under the sway of these intimations and may be read as a beckoning 
of the reader to overcome the desire to avoid them. The conversion 
Heidegger beckons us to make is one from inauthentic everyday­
ness, which is most distinctly characterized by its ontological 
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somnambulism, to the authentic, in which we resolutely grasp 
ourselves as Being-towards-death. And, as Jerome Miller explains, 
"because Being and Time as a whole has principally in view the 
undoing of avoidances, it is not just about dying but an exercise in 
dying" (Miller, p. 207). 
But dying in what sense? What does it mean to die? Can, for 
example, the reading of a text be a death? Can the loss of a loved one 
or the collapse of a project to which one has devoted one's life be a 
death? Can any of these events prompt, as only death can, an 
experience of nothingness capable of awakening the fundamental 
ontological question in such a radical way that it reaches far beyond 
the mere fonning of aninterrogative to the very depths of ourbeing? 
William Barrett answers this question negatively whenhe writes, 
"man can surmount all other heartbreaks, even the death's of those 
he loves, but his own death puts an end to him" (Barrett, p. 225).2 
Sartre, in a different manner than Barrett, argues that such events 
cannot be understood as deaths insofar as we never experience 
death, but we do experience the various "heartbreaks" described. 
Sartre, in direct opposi tion to Heidegger' s assertion that death is our 
"owrunost possibility," takes the Epicurean stance that death is 
"really nothing, for so long as we are, death has not come, and when 
it has come, we are not." Even Heidegger insists that such experi­
ences are merely existentiell crises and do not open us to the funda­
mental ontological question.3To enforce his claim. Heidegger devel­
ops a complex nomenclature to distinguish between onticj ontologi­
cal experiences and existentiellj existential self-awareness, devotes 
section 47 of Being and Time to arguing against the possibility of angst 
being spawned by the death of an other, and points out that, for 
2 Barrett's statement seems to me to suffer from an inappropriately "literal" 
reading of Heidegger. Against stIch a reading, Jerome Miller asserts that: "a literal 
reading of Heidegger can mislead one into thinking that an encounter with death 
occurs only when one faces one's own physical demise. Being und Time is, among 
other things, an argument against just such literality; the encounter with death it 
describes occurs whenever one's world is shattered, irrespective of the event which 
triggers it" OW, n. 212). 
3I've for some time now been grappling with why Heidegger drives such an 
uncompromising wedge between ontologically disclosive experiences and ontic/ 
existentiell experiences. In an obvious way, he is developing rigid distinctions 
between the ontic and the ontological because he holds that confusion between the 
two was precisely what led Western ontology astray. Further, Heidegger is acu tely 
aware of how we often allow the drama of crisis to divert us from the fundamental 
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Kierkegaard, the focus on existentiell problems greatly impeded his 
understanding of fundamental ontology (BT, p. 494). Heidegger 
argues that the loss of loved ones, the reading of "world changing" 
texts and the failure of life-long projects, like any other events within 
the world, are ontic occurrences-sources of potential existentiell 
crises. Rather than advancing the pursuit of fundamental ontology, 
they actually hinder progress by drawing us into the world and 
diverting us from the "uncanniness" of angst which reveals us as not­
at-home within the world. 
Thus, the consensus among these thinkers is that existentiell 
crises do not and cannot raise the fundamental ontological question 
ofwhat itmeans to be. Instead of being ontologically disclosive, their 
powerful impact on our lives evidences how severely we take the 
question for granted. But are all existentiell crises fundamentally the 
same? Are they all so easily homogenized within the framework of 
our everyday existence? Could itbe that some of these events disrupt 
our lives so radically, shatter us so completely, that no aspect of our 
lives remains untouched and that Being itself is revealed as pro­
foundly foreign and, for the first time, questionable? In short, is it 
reasonable to affirm that while existentiell crises are generally events 
that happen within our world, some are so devastating that they can 
only be adequat~ly discussed as happening to our world? It is my 
claim, and the burden of this essay, that it is not only a reasonable 
affirmation, but a necessary one. Those who find this assertion 
incompatible with the Heideggerian philosophy of Being and Time, I 
will suggest, do not take seriously enough either Heidegger's phe­
nomenological analysis of what it means to be-in-the-world, or how 
significantly this "basic state of Dasein" grounds our everyday 
ontological presuppositions which, in principle, must be shaken if 
we are going to ask the fundamental ontological question. 
In his discussion of the "worldhood" of the world, Heidegger 
illustrates the pre-positional situation of thrown Dasein by under-
ontological question. He would be the first to notice how we talk endlessly about the 
horrible things that happen to us. Although ordinarily, the potentially dcvastQting 
questions these events raise about the meaning of existence are repressed and 
covered over through "idle talk," "curiosity" and "ambiguity," Heidegger's distinc­
tion overlooks the possibility that they needn't be. Indeed, these questionsmay be 
intelligently addressed and allowed to rupture our deepest ontological assump­
tions. 
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scoring the prepositional condition of our being-in-the-world-with­
others. Countering the modemcOgito, Heidegger argues that we are 
not isolated subjects who are aware of our existence through an 
awareness of the internal activity of our thinking and who must, 
therefore, make a leap (of faith) over an abyss to reach the external 
world. Rather, Daseinis "Being-there." We originally find ourselves 
amidst the world. Arguing against the Cartesian and Kantian con­
ceptions of the world, Heidegger asserts that the "world" is neither 
res extensa nor is it merely a collection of objects, that is to say, the sum 
of its parts. The "worldhood" of the world, what makes it a world as 
such, is that it is more than this sum. The world is an horizon of 
meaning in terms of which all objects encountered are interpreted 
(BT, pp. 91-148).4 Each given object encountered by Dasein is mean­
ingful only in terms of its relation to its place in the totality, and the 
totality itself is given coherency by this horizon of meaning. But this 
horizon of meaning is neither given nor arbitrary; it blossoms forth 
from our involvement in the world. This is no minor distinction. For, 
as Dasein, who exists primordially as being-in-the-world-with-oth­
ers, and who is "fallen" amidst the world in average everydayness, 
we are susceptible to seduction by the "things" we encounter within 
the world. In fact, any given object within the world has the potential 
to astonish us and pull us under its sway so completely that it comes 
to Ittean the world to us. Falling in love, it seems to me, is an extremely 
accessible example of this, and its exploration may help draw our 
inquiry into phenomenological focus. 
Falling in love is truly afallingin that itpulls the ground out from 
under us and shatters the compass which governs the direction of 
our everyday routines. In a very literal sense, love sends us "head 
over heels." Fascinated by the beloved, everything else within the 
world seems to fall away as we draw nearer and nearer to her. Duties 
once taken so seriously somehow seem far less important; schedules 
once adhered to without question are suddenly broken with aban­
don; finances once shrewdly dispersed only on essentials are now 
spentwith spendthrift extravagance on the most impractical of gifts. 
4 See 1W, pp. 79-100 for a detailed account of the phenomenological structure 
of "Worlds." Also, see Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourse ofMode mihJ. Cam­
bridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1987; pp. 131-160 for a provocative discussion of "world" as 
"the key term of fundamental ontology" (p. 147) and its significance in modern/ 
postmociern discourse and controversy. 
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Everything around us reveals itself in a new, unfamiliar way. OUl' 
world is in flux; nothing appears as it did before; the meaning of 
every aspect of our life is transforming. And as the beloved settles in 
as the center of our life, all other objects encountered and all other 
events engaged once again draw near, but they approach differen.tly. 
Being that they are objects and events occurring within our world­
which is an horizon of meaning, not a collection of things or mere 
spatial extension-they are now interpreted in terms of this new 
horizon. And this horizon is determined by the other whom we find 
at its center. 
The beloved becomes the axis of meaning around which the 
"global" circumference of our circumspective concern spins. And if 
this is the case, then the blossoming ofthishorizon of meaning cannot 
be correctly understood as an ontic occurrence happening within our 
world; for it is the very foundation of the worldhood of our world. It 
mustbe conceded that what is happening is happening to ourworld. 
Thus, if to be is to be-in-the-world-with-others and the parameters of 
this world are governed by the other whom has become its center, 
then death, which according to Heidegger "mean[s] gOing-out-of­
the-world, and losing one's being-in-the-world, occurs "not when 
objects disappear but when [our world' sl fundamentul structures of 
meaning ... are undermined" (l31', p. 281; WS, p. 194). With this 
understanding of what it meuns to be-in-the-world, it then seems 
clear that the founding of our world cannot reasonably be relegated 
to the purely ontic; it cannot be understood in tem1S of studying the 
particular person, object or project which has become the center of 
our life. Likewise, neither can the deconstruction of our world, via 
the collapse of its center, be properly understood as simply an 
existentiell crisis; it cannot be appropriately explained in terms of the 
absence of an object within the world. These experiences are, ra ther, 
the construction and deconsh"uction of the base on which we rest our 
understanding of what it means to be. 
Ordinarily, in our average everydayness, we find ourselves 
comfortably situated in a world which has blossomed forth for us 
and which, since this blossoming, we have come to take for granted. 
We feel "at home" within this world and easily maneuver through­
out it, casually engaging with the objects within our circumspedive 
concern as they lend themselves as ready-to-hand instruments for 
use in our various projects. Our understanding of Being itself is 
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grounded in and delimited by our perspective within this world. 
This becomes painfuUy evident when our world falls apart. 
When we lose the other, who has come to mean the world to us, 
we lose the axis of meaning in terms of which we understood our life 
as a whole. Having lost this other, nothing makes sense. For, "here the 
totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at­
hand discovered within the world is ... of no consequence; it col­
lapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking 
significance" (BT, p. 231). Our daily chores, once done without 
question in order to keep our world together, now induce nausea with 
their banal absurdity. Joy now seems possible only for the naive. We 
feel that despair is the only true glimpse of reality, though it is never 
black enough to be pure. We are not only depressed but morally 
offended. The tragedy is experienced not as one event among others, 
but as an affront to existence as it is meantto be. We contemplate, and 
may even commit suicide, preferring physical demise over confront­
ing the fact that Being is proving itself to beradicaUy other thanwhat 
we thought it was.s 
But just as we may be shaken from our comfortable use of ready­
to-hand materials by a disruption in this use (e.g., the car breaks 
down), and thereby be forced to understand these objects in an 
entirely new way (as present-at-hand), we may also be awakened 
from our ontological somnambulism by a crisis so devastating that 
it refuses to be understood in terms of our world (BT,pp.102-107). A 
crisis of this depth and magnitude cannot be homogenized within 
the framework of our circumspective concern as one event among 
others, because it undermines the structures of meaning which 
enable aU possible events to be understood. 
Thus, to hold fast that these supposedly existentieU crises are 
5 That suicide is the refusal to throw one's self and one's ontological assump­
tions into question, rather than the fundamental question itself, refutes Camus' 
claim that "there is but one truly philosophical problem, and that is suicide." 
Properly speaking, suicide is not a problem bu t a supposed solution to which one 
may come only after "judging whether life is or is not worth living." The Myth of 
Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955: p. 3. The fundamental, or "truly serious," 
prob lem, to which suicide purports to be an answer, is the question of the meaning 
of Being. What I am suggesting is that suicide is not an answer to the question but 
the refusal to ask it. For a remarkably creative response to Heideggerian ontology, 
Camus' absurdist position and the futility of suicide, see Levinas. E. Time and The 
Other. trans. Robert Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1987; p. 50, passim. 
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necessarily excluded from ontological discolITse overlooks the real­
ization that the truly radical of these events happen to and not within 
our world and, therefore, dismantle the structlITes which enabled us 
to understand anything, including Being. This exclusion presup­
poses that those who experience such a crisis have a conception of the 
meaning of Being that transcends the parameters of their everyday 
concern. But, as our phenomenological sketch of the loss-of-our­
world indicates, in OlIT average everydayness, the boundaries of OlIT 
ontological understanding are strictly delimited by that which has 
become the center of our world. This being the case, only the loss of 
the center of this horizon of meaning can precipitate the sort of 
ontological uncertainty characterized by Heideggerian angst. It is 
precisely this uncertainty that prompts a mortifying questioning 
which, if not repressed, will undermine OlIT ontological presupposi­
tions and allow the fundamental ontological question of the meaning 
of Being to be raised anew, in all its dreadfulness. The marginalizing 
of these supposedly ontic events closes off and restricts from onto­
logical discourse the very breach in our ontological assumptions 
which, ifpursued, will result in a radical rethinking of w hat itmeans 
to be. Rather than plunging us into this breach and compelling us to 
confront the dreadful questions that crisis raises about our lives, this 
marginalizing restricts these events to the ontic1evel. Consequently, 
against Heidegger's intent, it "helps to keep one's ownmost non­
relational possibility-of-being completely concealed" (BT, p. 298). 
Still, many will contend that even the most devastating of 
existentiell crises (e.g., our beloved abandons us, or a tumor is found 
in our child) are objects of fear, not angst in the face of nothingness. 
This contention holds that whereas angst is "already 'there' and yet 
nowhere, ... is so close that it stifles one's breath, and yet it is 
nowhere," fear is always of "a detrimental entity [or ontic event] 
within the world which comes from some definite region, .,. is 
bringing itself close ... and yet might stay away" (BT, pp. 231, 230). 
This argument concludes that if our beloved returned to us, or our 
child's tumor were found to be benign-that is, if the danger were to 
"stay away"-we would remain placidly embedded within OlIT 
world rather than radically uprooted from it, as OCClITS in angst. 
The problem wi th this objection is threefold. Firs tly, it fails to take 
seriously what itmeans to be-in-a-world and the central importance 
of the other, who establishes this world's axis. Secondly, it overlooks 
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the insight that an experience of nothingness, or the loss-of-our-world, 
occurs when the fundamental structures of our horizon of meaning 
are undermined. And lastly, it fails to see that an intimation of the 
frailty-the liability to nothingness-of what means the world to us 
transcends the fear of any particular object or event, and opensus up 
to our "ownmost possibility" insofar as it awakens us to the radical 
finitude of every person or thing, every possible world. We are 
intimated of the desolate nothingness pervading everything that 
could ever mean the world to anyone-even ourselves. 
To the degree that these intimations and the questions they raise 
about Being are repressed, they may be relegated to the domain of 
fear because we refuse to allow them to touch our ontolOgical 
presuppositions. Rather than drawing us away from our world, it is 
precisely this world and our position in it that is secured most 
adamantly. However, these intimations and the questions they raise 
need not be repressed. And to the extent that we allow them to 
rupture our ontological assumptions, we are open to the encounter 
withnothingness and ourownmostpossibilityofbeing ablenottobe. 
In short, if such questi.ons are not repressed, we find ourselves 
radically dislocated, spiraling in the abyss, confronted with the 
inherent nothingness of what we always assumed was Being itself. 
It is only in such a destitute position. I would like to suggest, that 
the fundamental ontological question of what it means to be can be 
authentically asked. For only in this barren state do we realize the 
uncompromising import of the question. And this question, as we 
have seen, is not only raised by an uncanny experience of angst, 
which oozes through and draws us away from our comfort in the 
world when everything is ontically normal and existentielly placid. 
It may also be precipitated by an existentiell crisis which most 
Heideggerians, and Heidegger himself, would argue tends to draw 
us away from intimations of death as our ownmost possibility. Their 
argument is justified, I have claimed, insofar as we ordinarily recoil 
from these intimations and, quite often, divert ourselves from them 
with preoccupati.on in the drama of life's crises. I have attempted to 
illustrate, though, that this contention takes for granted that existentiell 
crises always occur as events within our world. But what is passed 
over in silence is the possibility that a crisis which fractures the center 
of our world must be said to happen to it not within it. And because 
we ordinarily equate Being with the parameters of our world, the 
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shattering of this world can be understood as no less than the 
shattering of everything we thought was immune to deconstruction. 
Only whenoursedimented structures of meaning have collapsed 
can the possibility of a new horizon be glimpsed. Only when every­
thing we ever thought was Being itself is undermined, only when 
Being reveals itself as radically foreign-as radically beyond any and 
every understanding we may have had of it-can it become ques­
tionable in its very essence and compel the fundamental ontological 
question to spring to our lips ... and this is only the beginning ... 
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